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INTRODUCTION
The information risk management is currently one of the most important and dynamically developing directions of strategic and operational management in the field of information security. Computer networks play an important role in many areas. Successful cyber attacks lead to considerable financial, image and other losses and provoke the increase in the number of potential attackers. Rising demands lead to complexity of structure and increasing size of the networks, which in its turn leads to increased complexity of security analysis and delay in application of protective countermeasures.
The main task of computer security specialists is rapid response to changes of the current security status of all the components of the corporate information system. For this purpose it is useful to have a software system that allows quickly determining the type of an attack without any special skills, learning the latest information about possible consequences of the attack and how to prevent them.
Computer attacks can be divided into two classes: single-step and multi-step attacks (Dawkins and Hale, 2004) . In a single-step attack, the attacker exploits a vulnerability, commits an attack, and reaches his ultimate goal. Multi-step attacks are more complicated. The attacker can exploit the vulnerability not to immediately achieve the goal, but to open a new vulnerability, which can be used for carrying out another attack. In this case, the ultimate objective is achieved at the end of the chain of multiple attacks.
There are two peculiar properties of multi-step attacks: random relationship between multiple attack steps and uncertainty in the description of the attack steps of a multi-step attack (Zhang, et al., 2014; Zhai and Zhou, 2011) . Therefore, it is impossible to manually analyze all possible combinations of the attacks.
One of the possible approaches to the analysis of network security includes attack modeling and impact assessment based on attack graphs (Xinming Ou, 2006) . The concept of "attack graph" is quite simple. An attack graph is a graph that represents all possible sequences of attacks that allow the attacker to reach his goals through multi-step exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Attack graphs can be a useful tool in different areas of computer security. A system administrator can use attack graphs for: − building a list of attacks to which the system is vulnerable in the current configuration;
− search for ways how an attacker can achieve a specific purpose; − determination of the countermeasures which should be taken to ensure the security of the system. This paper examines the precedent approach to building attack graphs. This approach is based on the model-theoretic formalization of domain ontologies (Palchunov, 2006; Palchunov, 2008) . The formal description of the structure of the knowledge base is made with the Description Logic (Baader, et al., 2007) . Formalization of estimated (fuzzy) judgments is made in the language of the Fuzzy Model Theory (Pal'chunov and Yakhyaeva, 2015) . Software implementation of the knowledge base is made with the Neo4j 1 graph DBMS.
RELATED WORK
At present there are more than a hundred software systems for information risk management. All of them can be divided into two groups (Alhomidi and Reed, 2014 ):
• basic software systems for qualitative risk analysis;
• full analysis software systems for quantitative risk analysis.
Basic software systems are commonly used by the companies of the 3rd CMM maturity level (Carcary, 2013 There is currently no commonly used definition of the "attack graph" concept, and various research groups often mean different things by this word combination.
One of the approaches (Sheyner, et al., 2002) is to define the attack model, which is a finite state machine with multiple states and possible transitions between them, where each element of the set of states describes the state of the entire computer network at the current stage of the computer attack. The attack graph of the specified model is the set of finite sequences of transitions from the initial state of the system in such states that violate specified security property. This approach has one major drawback. With the growth of the number of nodes in a computer network, the number of possible states of the network increases exponentially, making the creation of such attack graph practically useful only for small networks with a small number of vulnerabilities.
Another approach is based on building a logical attack graph (Wayne and Boyer, 2006) . In this approach the graph node is a logical expression. It describes not the state of the network as a whole, but only one aspect of this state. Graph edges represent causal connections between the network configuration and the potential privileges that an attacker can get.
This logical approach has two certain advantages over the "attack scenario" approach. Firstly, logical attack graph clearly defines the causal relationship between the system configuration and potential attacker's privileges. In the case of "scenario" approach it would be necessary to take into account the full description of the system state on one or several of the preceding steps to determine the causes of dangerous situation. While logical graph represents that causal relationship with the edges of the graph. It is possible to restore all possible attack scenarios by performing a simple depth-first traversal of the logical graph. Secondly, the size of the logical graph always depends polynomially on the size of the network, and the size of the scenario graph in the worst case has an exponential dependence on the size of the network. This paper introduces one more semantics of the "attack graph" concept. In the proposed approach a graph node is a precedent of a computer attack with several properties. The edges of the graph are based on the values of two properties of an attack precedent: necessary preconditions to commit this attack, and the consequences that the attack has for the system. The oriented edge from graph vertex A to vertex B is built if the consequences of committing attack A open the possibility of carrying out the attack B. The multi-step attack is a path through this oriented graph, each vertex of which is reachable from the previous one by a single step over a directed edge.
THE KNOWLEDGE BASE ON COMPUTER SECURITY

Knowledge Base Structure
Let's consider the domain Δ = "computer attacks". All atomic concepts of the subject area are divided into six classes: 1) ℙ : "Symptoms"; 2) ℙ : "Threats"; 3) ℙ : "Vulnerabilities"; 4) ℙ : "Consequences"; 5) ℙ : "Losses"; 6) ℙ : "Countermeasures".
Each of these concept classes is represented in the database as a treelike structure, and each attack case is characterized by concepts from these classes . A set of concepts for each class is composed by parsing the database of computer security precedents, the National Vulnerability Database (the NIST 6 agency). The NVD is a USA state project, a regularly updated database of computer vulnerabilities with the descriptions (or references to the descriptions in the other Internet resources) of vulnerabilities discovered in various software systems and components.
The descriptions of these vulnerabilities contain information on which version of the product is affected by this vulnerability, how it could be exploited, what measures can be taken to remedy this vulnerability, and other information. Table 1 shows some examples of atomic concepts for each of the classes.
Hereafter let's denote the atomic concepts by ( ) , where the top index means that ( ) ∈ ℙ . For formalization of knowledge in the domain Δ the binary relation ⊆ ℙ × ℙ is introduced. The semantics of this relation is the following: 〈 ( ) ; ( ) 〉 ∈ iff the consequence (of some attack) ( ) opens vulnerability ( ) . On the basis of this relation the atomic role is defined.
Therefore, in the domain Δ we will examine a finite set ℙ = ℙ ∪ ℙ ∪ ℙ ∪ ℙ ∪ ℙ ∪ ℙ of atomic concepts and one atomic role . The set of all concepts of the domain Δ is composed according to the standard syntax of the Description Logic. All the concepts from are divided into role concepts (i.e. using an atomic role ) and nonrole concepts.
Terminology of the object domain or (i.e. intensional knowledge about the domain) consists of the set of all the specialization axioms, representing the hierarchical structure of concept classes.
The second component of a knowledge base is the World Description or (i.e. extensional knowledge about the domain). In the , individuals are firstly introduced by giving them names, and then the asserts properties of these individuals (Baader, et al., 2007) .
In the domain Δ lets define individuals as the precedents of computer attacks. The main sources of information about computer attacks for RiskPanel system are corporate databases, NIST and MITRE 7 . Each attack is characterized by the presence/absence of certain concepts from each class of concepts ℙ . Thus, for each attack we build a finite set of concept assertions of the following two kinds: 
Model-theoretic Formalization of Estimated Judgements
To perform statistical analysis of the data we need the precedent model and the fuzzy model of the domain (Pulchunov and Yakhyaeva, 2005; Yakhyaeva, 2007) .. These models are composed, based on the interpretation set of the Knowledge Base .
Consider a finite set of the computer attacks = , … , which was used for describing . Let be a domain of quantification. Then is a binary relation over this domain, and ℙ is a collection of unary relations as well. Denote = ℙ ∪ . Then Definition 1. Algebraic system =〈 , 〉 is called interpretation of if ⊨ (i.e. for each concept assertion ∈ we have ⊨ ).
Definition 2. An ordered triple ( ) ⇋ 〈 , , 〉 is called a precedent model of the domain , generated by the interpretation = 〈 , 〉, provided that for every concept ( ) ∈ we have τ( ( )) = ∈ | ⊨ ( ) .
In the precedent model each concept is associated with the set of computer attack precedents which have this concept as a characteristic. Note that from the model-theoretical point of view, the model ( ) is a Boolean-valued model. In this Boolean-valued model each proposition of the signature ∪ is associated with an element of Boolean algebra ( ).
Most methods of statistical processing of data use objective and/or subjective probability. The objective probability refers to the relative frequency of occurrence of any event in the set of observations or the ratio of the number of desired events to the total number of observations. The subjective probability refers to the degree of confidence of some expert or group of experts that this event will actually happen.
In the proposed approach the concept of fuzzy model is used to describe objective probabilities.
Definition 3. An ordered triple
( ) ⇋ 〈 , , 〉 is called a fuzzy model of the domain , generated by the interpretation = 〈 , 〉, provided that for every concept ( ) ∈ we have
In the fuzzy model, the truth values of the statements (concepts) are the numbers from the interval [0, 1], which represent the objective probability of concept belonging to a random attack precedent. A more detailed description of the properties of the precedent and fuzzy models can be found in the works of (Yakhyaeva, 2009; Pal'chunov and Yakhyaeva, 2015) .
Note that the information about precedents from the Internet can be not complete. Then (according to the "open-world semantics" paradigm) we have a set of different interpretations of the . From the perspective of the model theories, it is a class of models generated by the set of sentences . Denote the class of all the interpretations of as = | ⊨ .
Definition 4. An ordered triple ⇋ 〈 , , 〉 is called the generalized fuzzy model of the domain
, generated by the class of interpretations , provided that for every concept
Consider the concept ( ) ∈ . Let = ‖ ∈ | ∀ ∈ : ⊨ ( ) ‖ and = 1 − ‖ ∈ | ∀ ∈ : ⊭ ( ) ‖.
In paper ( (Yakhyaeva & Yasinskaya, 2015) ) it was proven that inf ( ) = ‖ ‖ and sup ( ) = ‖ ‖ .
Note that if ( ) ∈ is not a role concept than
And if ( ) is a role concept than
ALGORITHMS OF RISK ANALYSIS
Risk analysis is the systematic use of available information to determine how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences 8 . In our case, risk analysis is determining the probability of threats, vulnerabilities, consequences and losses which may happen as a result of a computer attack on a corporate information system. In other words, the problem of risk analysis is finding the infimum and the supremum of truth values of concepts from on the generalized fuzzy model . Note that if ( ) ∈ is a non-role concept, then it describes the state which the system will have after a single-step computer attack. The article (Yakhyaeva and Yasinskaya, 2015) describes the algorithm getPDNFVerityOnCase, computing truth values for such concepts. The algorithm is proven to be correct. The work describes the module of the RiskPanel system, implementing risk analysis for single-step attacks in the question-answer mode.
On the other hand, role concepts describe properties of multi-step attacks. This work proposes algorithms for answering the following questions: (Q1) What is the probability that after some multistep attack the system will have the state, matching the description of non-role concept ( )? (Q2) What is the probability that after any multi-step attack the system, sooner or later, will definitely have the state, matching the description of non-role concept ( )? Questions (Q1) and (Q2) can be formalized with concepts
where is any non-role concept.
Our task is to find the infimum (denoted by inf ( )) and the supremum (denoted by sup( )) of truth values of these concepts on the generalized fuzzy model . Let us consider the graph = 〈 , 〉 defined on the set of attack precedents. We 8 http://www.palisade.com/risk/risk_analysis.asp perform postfix traversal of . As a result, every graph vertex is assigned with one of the three values: TRUE, UNKNOWN or FALSE. Therefore
where ( ) is the number of vertices in the graph labeled , ( ) is the number of vertices in labeled and -total amount of vertices in .
Here we provide pseudocode of the two algorithms, FuzGLEMP (Fuzzy graph labeling for the extended modality of possibility) and FuzGLEMN (Fuzzy graph labeling for the extended modality of necessity), for labeling graph with concepts and respectively (see Table 2 and Table 3 ). Both algorithms are based on the bottom-up graph labeling algorithm from ( (Blackburn, et al., 2007) , which was modified to work with noncomplete knowledge about computer attack precedents. 
SOFTWARE INTERFACE DESCRIPTION
We developed a software system called RiskPanel asessentially a workplace for experts to ensure the security of corporate information, based on the methodology of generalized fuzzy models (Pulchunov, et al., 2011) . RiskPanel has a module for analysis of the various multi-step computer attacks. Consider the module interface. The main window (Fig. 1) has four main areas: − A -the input area − B -the area for selection of atomic concepts − C -the area with detailed information about atomic concepts − D -the output area Input area A allows user to enter the specific question (Fig. 2) .
First of all, the user selects the type of his question (drop-down list (1)). Currently there are only two types: MODAL_BOX and MODAL_DIAMOND (implementing the concepts and respectively). Secondly the user composes non-role concept ( ), which is what the question is related to. Atomic concepts (2), necessary for composition of the concept ( ) can be selected in the main window area B. Clicking with the left mouse button on the concept shows all the available information related to this concept in the area C. Logical operators, connecting atomic concepts, can be set with drop-down selectors (3). The new operator or an atomic concept can be added by pressing the button (4). If the newly added item is an operator, then its operands will be empty, and buttons like (4) are displayed instead of them.
When the statement is composed, the user can press the button (5) to start computation of the truth value of the statement. If the statement is not complete (e.g. there are still some empty operands left), the user will be warned about this. The truth value cannot be calculated until the user composes the complete statement.
If the computation is successful, the area D will contain the truth probability interval of the composed statement.
CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes methods of quantitative risk analysis of multi-step computer attacks. These methods are based on the combination of the precedent approach to knowledge representation and description logic. Domain knowledge is represented as a finite set of real attack precedents, i.e. a set of semi-structured natural language texts.
Based on these precedents, in TBox and ABox terms of the Discription Logic the Knowledge Base is built. For each interpretation of the Knowledge Base the precedent and the fuzzy model of the domain is generated. The class of fuzzy models, generated by the set of all possible interpretations is a generalized fuzzy model. This model is used for evaluation of truth values of formula descriptions of information risks.
Developed methods are implemented in one of the modules of the "RiskPanel" software system.
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